We consider 3-candidate elections under a general scoring rule and derive precise conditions for a given voting situation to be strategically manipulable by a given coalition of voters. We present an algorithm that makes use of these conditions to compute the minimum size M of a manipulating coalition for a given voting situation.
Introduction
Following the proofs by Gibbard [5] and Satterthwaite [15] that every reasonable voting rule can be manipulated, several authors have tried to quantify the probability of such an event, under various assumptions on the distribution of voter opinions. These papers have differences in: the definition of manipulability; the measure of manipulability; the assumptions on voter preferences; whether the answers sought are exact (either derived via numerical computation or via an analytic formula for a fixed number of voters) or asymptotic (as the number of voters grows large). They also differ markedly in their generality and mathematical sophistication.
The present article considers in detail the problem of coalitional manipulation of a positional voting rule. Our aims throughout are generality, simplicity and rigour. We consider a general positional voting rule, derive linear equations and inequalities describing exactly whether or not a given voting situation is manipulable by a given subset of the voters, and use these to show how to efficiently compute the minimum size of a manipulating coalition. We present numerical results based on enumeration of the manipulable voting situations, for positional voting rules in the 3-alternative case. This allows a complete picture of the distribution of the size of a minimum manipulating coalition for moderate numbers of voters, and suggests various conjectures about the asymptotic behaviour.
Tie-breaking for positional rules
All positional rules contain the possibility of tied scores for first place. In this event, a separate tiebreaking rule will be needed. One common tie-breaking rule is to resort to a pre-determined arbitrary order (for example, lexicographic order, or the French practice of allowing the oldest candidate to prevail). Though simple to implement, this is not always so convenient for analysis. Another method is to give one of the voters a casting vote. However, this is even less tractable from a theoretical point of view, as it means that the winner can no longer always be determined from the voting situation only, but may require consultation of the full profile.
Here we will use the random tie-breaking method. That is, in the event of a tie, the winner will be chosen at random, with all candidates with the maximum score being equally likely to be chosen. This method complicates the voting by introducing probabilistic considerations, and of course does not yield a voting rule in the classical deterministic sense. However, it has the great advantage that it preserves the symmetry among candidates (such rules are called neutral). This is important for the large-scale computational studies undertaken in this paper, as the symmetry can be exploited to reduce the amount of work required. Furthermore, it can be strongly argued that such a tie-breaking method is fairer than any method that breaks the symmetry between candidates.
Manipulation
We present below the basic definitions used throughout this article. There are many other concepts of manipulability; we discuss this further in Section 5.
Definition 1.7.
We define manipulability of a voting situation in stepwise fashion as follows.
• A rule is manipulable at a voting situation σ if and only if there is exists a profile π giving rise to σ, at which the rule is manipulable;
• a rule is manipulable at the profile π if and only if there exists a manipulating coalition at this profile;
• a subset X ⊆ V is a manipulating coalition at the profile π if and only if there is a profile π = π which agrees with π on V \ X and is preferred to π by all members of X;
• -a profile π with (untied) winning candidate a is preferred by voter v to a profile π with (untied) winning candidate a if v prefers a to a; -To compare profiles in which scores are tied for first place, it is necessary to compare probability distributions on the set of candidates. We do this in the standard sense of stochastic order. That is, v prefers π to π if for each k = 1, . . . , m the probability of electing one of his most-favoured k candidates under π is no less than under π. (If π = π, the condition implies that this probability will be strictly greater for some k.)
Note in particular that a voter will never prefer to increase the probability of electing the candidate he favours least, or to decrease the probability of electing the candidate he favours most. In three-candidate elections, these two conditions constitute a full description of the preference rule.
Example 1.8 (manipulation).
Consider the plurality rule defined by the weight vector (1, 0, 0), and an election in which sincere preferences are such that 4 voters have the opinion abc, 3 have the opinion bca, and 2 have the opinion cab. The scoreboard is then (4, 3, 2) and a is the sincere winner.
The subset consisting of all the bca and cab voters can manipulate. Indeed, if the bca voters vote strategically as cba and the cab voters continue to vote cab, then the original winner a is replaced by c. Each of the types of voters in the coalition prefers the new election outcome to the sincere one.
Sincere outcome Manipulated outcome Possible?
Coalition member types Type 1. |a| > |b| ≥ |c| (i) b wins yes bac, bca, cba (prefer b to a) I (ii) a, b tie yes bac, bca, cba (prefer b to a) I (iii) c wins yes cab, cba, bca (prefer c to a) I (iv) a, c tie yes cab, cba, bca (prefer c to a) I (v) b, c tie no (vi) 3-way tie no 2. |a| = |b| > |c| (i) a wins yes abc, acb, cab (prefer a to b) II (ii) b wins yes bac, bca, cba (prefer b to a) II (iii) c wins no (iv) a, c tie yes cba, cab, acb (prefer c to b) III (v) b, c tie yes cab, cba, bca (prefer c to a) III (vi) 3-way tie no 3. |a| = |b| = |c| any no Table 1 : Manipulation of 3-candidate elections.
Note that no manipulation in favour of b is possible in this situation, since the only voters preferring b to a are already contributing the maximum score to b and the minimum to a.
Example 1.9 (manipulation involving ties).
Consider the Borda rule, defined by the weight vector (2, 1, 0), and an election in which sincere preferences are such that 1 voter has the opinion abc, 3 voters have the opinion acb, 4 voters have opinion bac, and 3 voters have opinion cba. The scoreboard is then (12, 12, 9) .
The subset consisting of all acb and cba voters can manipulate. If all of them change their votes to cab, then the new scoreboard becomes (12, 9, 12) . Note that all members of the coalition prefer c to b and hence prefer this election outcome in the sense of stochastic order. The winning probability distribution on the candidates has changed from (1/2, 1/2, 0) to (1/2, 0, 1/2).
Example 1.10 (minimal manipulation).
Consider the rule with weight vector (4, 3, 0) and the voting situation in which the opinion acb is held by 1 voter, and the opinions abc, bac, cab, and cba are each held by 2 voters. The scoreboard is (24, 20, 19) . A manipulating coalition can be formed by the two cba voters and one of the bac voters (who all change their vote to bca, thus handing victory to b). The reader may verify that this coalition is minimal, that is, that no coalition with fewer than three members can manipulate. (A coalition of one cba and one bac could achieve a 3-way tie, but this is not a preferred outcome for the bac voter.)
Manipulation of scoring rules in the 3-alternative case
For a fixed scoring rule defined by its weight vector w, a fixed voting situation σ, and a fixed subset X ⊆ V, we shall determine whether X is a valid manipulating coalition with the power to change the outcome of the election. Without loss of generality, the voting situation σ is such that the candidates' scores are in non-decreasing order: |a| ≥ |b| ≥ |c|. The possible types of manipulations are itemized in Table 1 .
We note that there are three essentially different kinds of manipulation possible. In cases 1(i), 1(ii), 1(iii), and 1(iv), there is a clear winner, and manipulation is in favour of one of the other candidates, who is promoted to clear or joint winner. These manipulations we call Type I. In cases 2(i) and 2(ii), there is a tie for first place, and one of the tied candidates is promoted to sole winner by manipulation.
These we call Type II manipulations. In cases 2(iv), 2(v) , there is a tie for first place, and the bottom candidate is promoted to tie with one of the original winners. These we call Type III manipulations.
As noted in Table 1 , some types of manipulations never occur. We deal with these first. Proof. Suppose that a is the sincere winner. A coalition to create a tie between b and c must consist entirely of voters who prefer both b and c to a (types bca and cba). Other voter types will not prefer the b, c tie to a clear win for a in the sense of stochastic order, because it has a higher probability of electing their least-favoured candidate. These voters are already contributing w 3 (the minimum possible) to the score of a, so no strategic voting by them can decrease the score of a. Similarly, they are already contributing (w 1 + w 2 )/2 (the maximum possible) to the average score of b and c, so no strategic voting by them can increase that average score. Hence, they are unable to bring about any situation in which the average score of b and c exceeds the score of a. In particular, the scores of b and c cannot be made equal and greater than a's score. The other cases are handled by similar arguments. For (ii), the only possible coalition members are those who prefer c to both a and b. For (iii), there are two sub-cases. Making any single candidate the sole winner will be preferred only by voters who rank that candidate first, while creation of any two-way tie will be preferred only by voters who rank the other candidate in last place. For (iv), if there is a sincere sole winner then the 3-way tie will be preferred only by voters who ranked that candidate last. If the sincere outcome is a 2-way tie, the 3-way tie will be preferred only by voters who ranked the other candidate first.
Linear conditions describing manipulability
We now turn to the class of possible manipulations described in Table 1 . We shall derive linear systems of equations and inequalities that describe exactly which voting situations are manipulable. Each of the types I-III need only be analysed once, since the other cases of the same type are obtained by applying an appropriate transposition of the candidates. We consider the type I case where |a| > |b| ≥ |c| and manipulation is in favour of b, the type II case |a| = |b| > |c| where manipulation is in favour of b, and the type III case |a| = |b| > |c| where manipulation is in favour of c.
To save space we shall write w i − w j as w ij from now on. Suppose that a manipulating coalition X contains x i voters of type i (i = 1, . . . , 6). We first consider the type I and type II manipulations -the results are displayed in Figure 1 . All members of X must prefer b to a, so we have
It is clear that if manipulation is possible at all, it is certainly achievable by each voter ranking b first (this is a dominant strategy for such voters).
Let y 1 , y 2 denote the numbers of voters who strategically vote bac, bca. The strategic scores then 
all x i , y j are integers.
0 < x 3 w 21 + x 4 w 31 + x 6 w 32 + y 1 w 12 + y 2 w 13 (IP: IIb) |c| − |b| < x 3 w 31 + x 4 w 21 + x 6 w 12 + y 1 w 13 + y 2 w 12
become |a| , |b| , |c| , where
For b to become the sole winner, or tie with a, it is necessary and sufficient that the inequalities |b| ≥ |a| , |b| > |c| be satisfied. We also know that y 1 + y 2 equals the size of the coalition. These conditions immediately yield the first system shown in Figure 1 . The type II analysis is very similar and yields the second system of Figure 1 . The other cases may be obtained by applying a permutation: a ↔ b induces the permutation x 1 ↔ x 3 , x 2 ↔ x 4 , x 5 ↔ x 6 , while the transposition b ↔ c induces the permutation
The manipulations denoted in Table 1 as "Type III" are more complex. These are rare manipulations in which a tie is replaced with another tie (see Example 1.9). Members of a coalition manipulating in this way have no obvious dominant strategy: since the goal is to match two candidates' scores exactly, any of the six possible candidate orderings could potentially be a useful strategic vote. We shall see below (Theorem 2.3) that for the purposes of this article we may ignore type III manipulations. However, we record the defining linear system in Section 6 for possible future use.
It turns out that we need never consider type III manipulations to determine whether a situation is manipulable, or to compute the minimum size of a manipulating coalition. We now prove this. Proof. By symmetry we need only consider the case where the sincere result is |a| = |b| > |c| and we seek to being about a result |a| = |c| > |b|. Only voters with opinions cab, cba or acb would prefer the manipulated outcome. First consider plurality. No strategic action by these voters can increase (|a| + |c|)/2 or decrease |b|. Similarly in the antiplurality case, none of the willing voters can decrease (|a| + |b|)/2 or increase |c|. Thus in no case can c be promoted above b to tie with a.
Theorem 2.3. If a voting situation is type III-manipulable by a coalition X, then it is also type IImanipulable by a subset of X.
Proof. We may assume by Lemma 2.2 that we are dealing with neither plurality nor antiplurality. By symmetry we need only consider the situation when |a| = |b| > |c| and we seek to bring about a tie between a and c, with b the clear loser. Suppose that X is a coalition that can manipulate the outcome by means of type III manipulations. We have x 1 = x 3 = x 4 = 0. If x 6 = 0 then the coalition consisting of a single cba from X may strategically vote bca, promoting b to sole winner. Similarly if x 5 = 0 then a single cab may vote acb, promoting a to sole winner. Finally, we cannot have x 6 = x 5 = 0, since no strategic action by voters of type acb can increase |a| − |b|.
Minimum coalition size
In the present article, we are chiefly interested in whether a given situation is manipulable by some coalition, and if so, what is the minimum size of a manipulating coalition. As we have seen, these questions may be reduced to integer linear programs of the form
where
is a linear polytope, and for three candidates M = 6 and N = 2. (The linear conditions defining R 2 may include both strict and non-strict inequalities.) The situation is manipulable (in the particular way being considered) if and only if I(Z, Z) is feasible; the optimal value of I(Z, Z) gives the minimum coalition size.
Exact solution of such problems requires substantial computation in the worst case. Of course, we are dealing with a very small problem. However, several such problems must be solved for each voting situation, so it is important that they be solved as efficiently as possible. We shall now discuss this issue in detail.
Consider I(Z, Z). To begin with, define the following simpler problem.
where R 1 = {x ∈ R M | ∃y ∈ R N with (x, y) ∈ R 2 }. Geometrically, R 1 is the projection of the polytope R 2 onto the subspace where all y j are zero, and so it is also a linear polytope. The problem P(R) is thus a linear program; a relatively tractable problem. It is possible to derive R 1 from R 2 using the Fourier-Motzkin algorithm [16] . We now list some obvious but useful relations between the integer program I(Z, Z) and the projection P(R). In the Lemma below, note that the optimum of P(R) may not be attained if there are strict inequalities in the definition of R 1 ; if the optimum is attained then its value is of course m. Lemma 2.4 (relation between I(Z, Z) and P(R)). The following facts hold.
If P(R) is infeasible, then so is I(Z, Z).

Suppose that P(R) and let
either of the following conditions hold, then (x, y) is optimal for I(Z, Z).
• P(R) attains its optimal value and f (x) = x
• P(R) does not attain its optimal value and f (x) ≤ m + 1
We now derive explicit descriptions of R 1 , R 2 . The results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5 (constraints defining P). Let X be a manipulating coalition for a given voting situation. Let x i be the number of members of X of type i, for i = 1, . . . , 6. Then
3. it cannot be the case that |a| = |b| = |c|.
Proof. We derive the conditions on x in each case by systematically applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination.
Consider the constraints for Case 1(i)/1(ii) displayed in (IP: Ib). First use the equality constraint to eliminate y 2 . This yields the equivalent system |a| − |b| ≤ w 23 x 3 + w 12 x 6 + w 32 y 1 (IP: I'b) |c| − |b| < w 32 x 3 + 2w 12 x 6 + w 23 y 1
0 ≤ y 1 all x i and y 1 are integers.
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We now relax the condition on y 1 to y 1 ∈ R. For each pair of inequalities where the coefficient of y 1 occurs with different signs, we form a new inequality not involving y 1 by forming the appropriate positive linear combination of inequalities. This yields |a| − |b| ≤ w 23 x 3 + w 12 x 6 |c| − |b| < w 23 x 4 + (2w 12 + w 23 )x 6 |a| − 2|b| + |c| < 3w 12
all x i are integers.
The second and fourth inequalities are redundant since |b| > |c| and all x i are nonnegative. Thus we obtain the stated system (PROJ: Ib). The Case 1(iii)/(iv) conditions are derived similarly and displayed in (PROJ: Ic). Now consider Case 2(ii), whose integer linear system is displayed in (IP: IIb). A completely analogous argument to the previous case yields the inequalities in (PROJ: IIb). We obtain the equivalent system 0 < w 23 x 3 + w 12 x 6 + w 32 y 1 (IP: II'b) |c| − |b| < w 32 x 3 + 2w 12 x 6 + w 23 y 1
and then the system (PROJ: IIb) by Fourier-Motzkin elimination. Similarly, Case 2(i) yields the system (PROJ: IIa).
The linear programs in Theorem 2.5, along with Lemma 2.4 can be used as a shortcut to solve the integer programs of form I(Z, Z). However, caution is required: a feasible point for P(R), even if it has integral coordinates, need not correspond to any feasible point for I(Z, Z). Indeed, it is possible for a solution to P(R) (with integral coordinates) to exist even when the original problem I(Z, Z) is infeasible, as demonstrated by Example 2.6 below. This has apparently not been noticed by previous authors, perhaps because of Theorem 2.9 below, which covers the three most commonly studied rules, namely the plurality, antiplurality and Borda rules. Example 2.6 (P(R) feasible but I(Z, Z) infeasible). Consider the weight vector (4, 3, 0) and the voting situation in which 3 voters have sincere preference bac, 1 voter acb, and 1 voter cab. The scores are |a| = 16, |b| = 12, |c| = 7. The coalition consisting of the three bac voters (x 3 = 3 and all other x i = 0) satisfies the first set of necessary conditions given in Theorem 2.5, suggesting that it might be possible to manipulate in favour of b (Case 1(i)/(ii)). But the necessary and sufficient conditions (IP: Ib) require the existence of integers y 1 , y 2 such that y 1 + 4y 2 ≥ 7, 4y 1 + y 2 > 7, and y 1 + y 2 = 3, which leads to the impossible condition 4 ≤ 3y 2 < 5.
Example 2.7 (optimality gap between I(Z, Z) and P(R)). Consider the voting rule (8, 7, 0) and the voting situation in which 4 voters have sincere preference abc, 1 voter acb, 3 voters bac, 6 voters bca, and 6 voters cab. The scores are |a| = 103, |b| = 100, and |c| = 97. Suppose we are interested in Type I manipulations in favour of c. Solving the linear program (PROJ: Ic) produces an optimum at the corner x 5 = 3/7, x 4 = 3. The nearest feasible point with integer coordinates is x 5 = 1, x 4 = 4, but this is infeasible for the original problem (I(Z, Z)). Indeed, a coalition of one cab and four bca voters cannot manipulate; the best scoreboard they can produce (by all voting cba) is (96, 103, 101), leaving c still in second place. If a fifth bca voter is added to the coalition, the scoreboard becomes (96, 102, 102), but this is not a valid manipulation either, as the new outcome (a bc tie) is not preferred to an outright win for a by the cab voter. Adding the sixth bca voter to the coalition produces an outright win for c (scoreboard (96, 101, 103) ). This seven-member coalition is not minimal, however. A coalition of the six bca voters may also manipulate, producing the scoreboard (103, 94, 103) (note that all coalition members prefer the ac tie to an outright win for a).
The indivisibility of votes plays an important role in this situation. If fractional votes were permitted, only 3.44 votes (3.01 bca and 0.43 cab) would need to be changed to produce the scoreboard (99.99, 100, 100.01) and an outright win for c.
Remark 2.8. Example 2.7 shows that the minimum coalition size can be more than the ceiling of the optimum of P(R).
Computing the minimum coalition size
We now consider the various cases in detail, and simplify the integer programming problems analytically as far as possible. We make liberal use of Lemma 2.4.
First we treat the case |a| = |b| > |c|. The relaxation (and hence the original IP) is infeasible if w 23 ν 3 = 0 = w 12 ν 6 . From now on we assume that it is nonempty. Note that inf P(R) = 0.
Suppose first that w 12 ν 6 > 0. Then optimality is attained at x 3 = 0, x 6 = 1, which is the projection of the feasible point y 1 = 0, y 2 = 1, x 3 = 0 = x 4 , x 6 = 1 satisfying (IP: IIb).
On the other hand, suppose that w 12 ν 6 = 0 but w 23 ν 3 > 0. From (IP: II'b), we see that −w 23 x 3 < w 23 y 1 < |b| − |c| −w 23 x 3 must hold. Since also y 1 ≥ 0, this yields the constraint 0 < w 23 x 3 < |b|−|c|. If these last inequalities have no integer solution for x 3 = 1, the problem is infeasible. Otherwise, we can set y 1 = 0, y 2 = 1, x 4 = 0, x 3 = 1, x 6 = 0 in (IP: IIb) and obtain a solution that projects to a feasible point of P(R), which is optimal as above.
In summary, in this case the minimum size of a coalition that can manipulate in favour of b is 1 when such manipulation is possible. Such manipulation is impossible precisely when w 12 ν 6 = 0 and either w 23 = 0 or w 23 ≥ |b| − |c|. A similar argument deals with manipulation in favour of a, and we already know that no manipulation in favour of c is possible. Thus the minimum size of a manipulating coalition when |a| = |b| > |c| is 1, and we have precise conditions in terms of w and the scoreboard for when this is possible.
We now move on to the type I cases, where |a| > |b|. We need only consider case 1(i)/(ii), where b but not c has the maximum score after manipulation. That is, the feasible region of P(R) is given by (PROJ: Ib) and the feasible region of I(Z, Z) by (IP: Ib).
If 3w 12 ν 6 ≤ |a| − 2|b| + |c| or w 23 ν 3 + w 12 ν 6 < |a| − |b|, then P(R) is infeasible and hence so is I(Z, Z).
Otherwise, P(R) is feasible. We may then consider two subcases: w 12 ≥ w 23 ("easy") and w 12 ≤ w 23 ("hard"); see Figure 2 .3.
First, the easy case. Note that we have w 12 > 0. If w 12 ν 6 ≥ |a|−|b| then letting t := (|a|−|b|)/w 12 , the optimal value of P(R) corresponds to the point (0, t); this optimal value is precisely t. By Lemma 2.4 we see that an optimal solution of I(Z, Z) is given by x 6 = t = y 2 , with all other x i and y j equal to 0. The optimal value is thus t . Similarly, if ν 6 < t (note that this implies w 23 > 0), then, letting s = w 12 (t − ν 6 )/w 23 , the optimal value of P(R) corresponds to the point (s, ν 6 ), and we see by Lemma 2.4 that an optimal solution of I(Z, Z) is given by x 3 = s , x 6 = ν 6 , y 1 = 0, and y 2 = x 3 + x 6 . Note that in this easy case, I(Z, Z) is feasible if and only if P(R) is. Now for the hard case. If w 23 ν 3 + (|a| − 2|b| + |c|) + /3 < |a| − |b| (note this implies w 12 > 0), then the point (ν 3 , (|a| − 2|b| + |c|) + /(3w 12 )) does not satisfy the first inequality of (IP: Ib), so R 1 is a triangle and the optimal value of P(R) corresponds to the point (ν 3 , (|a| − |b| − w 23 ν 3 )/w 12 ). We can then use Lemma 2.4 to verify that an optimal solution of I(Z, Z) is given by x 3 = ν 3 , x 6 = (|a| − |b| − w 23 ν 3 )/w 12 , y 1 = 0, and
If, on the other hand, w 23 ν 3 + (|a| − 2|b| + |c|) + /3 ≥ |a| − |b|, then the optimal value of P(R) corresponds to a point on the lower edge of R 1 , as depicted in Figure ( It is worth noting that the point (0, (|a| − 2|b| + |c|) + /(3w 12 )) never satisfies the first inequality of (IP: Ib).) There does not seem to be an exact expression for the minimum coalition size in this case, but we have the following fast method for computing it. The least possible value of x 6 is x * 6 = (1 + (|a| − 2|b| + |c|)/(3w 12 ) ) + (or 0 if w 12 = 0). Consider in turn the values x 6 = x * 6 , . . . , ν 6 . For a given value of x 6 , the least possible value of x 3 is x 3 = (|a| − |b| − w 12 x 6 )/w 23 ; if this is strictly less than (|b| − |c| + 2w 12 x 6 )/w 23 , then these values of x 3 and x 6 along with y 1 = 0 and y 2 = x 3 + x 6 are a feasible point of I(Z, Z). Moreover, the first feasible point found by this method will be optimal for I(Z, Z). This is easy to see. Suppose that another point (x 3 , x 6 ) with x 6 > x 6 and x 3 + x 6 < x 3 + x 6 is also the projection of a feasible point for (I(Z, Z)). Then
In this hard case, I(Z, Z) may be infeasible even if P(R) is feasible (an example is given in Example 2.6); the iterative method of the previous paragraph will then reach x 6 = ν 6 without finding any solution.
The analysis above yields the following result. . Furthermore, the optimal value of (IP: Ib) is the greatest integer not exceeding the optimal value of (PROJ: Ib).
Proof. If w 12 ≥ w 23 , this follows from the easy-case arguments above. For w 12 = 0 (the anti-plurality rule), we must consider the hard case. Without loss of generality, w 23 = 1. If |a| − 2|b| + |c| ≥ 0 or ν 3 < |a| − |b|, P(R) is infeasible. Otherwise, P(R) is feasible, and we must apply the iterative algorithm discussed above. We begin with x 6 = x * 6 = 0 and corresponding x 3 = |a|−|b|; since this is less than |b|−|c|, we have immediately found an optimal solution of I(Z, Z). The optimal value for both I(Z, Z) and P(R) is |a| − |b|.
Description of the algorithm
Our exact results are of course based on enumeration of voting situations. However, our tie-breaking methods allow us to make use of symmetry to reduce the search space, as we now describe.
The group G of all permutations of the candidates acts on the set S of voting situations in a natural way. Whether a voting situation is manipulable is invariant under permutations of the candidates, so is a property of an orbit of G on S.
Clearly, we would like to examine only one representative from each G-orbit on S. However, a simple rule for carrying this out is not apparent. Below we give a simple rule that in most cases chooses a single representative, but in the worst case may choose the entire orbit.
where the l i are the multiplicities of the distinct scores, if σ ∈ F ; 0 otherwise.
Then for each G-invariant function µ on S, we have
Proof. The group G acts naturally on the scoreboards, and the score map taking voting situations to scoreboards commutes with the action of G. Thus each G-orbit O on S is mapped onto a G-orbit of scoreboards. Now O contains at least one element x such that its scoreboard s is in nonincreasing order, |a| ≥ |b| ≥ |c|. The size of the G-orbit of s is precisely c(x). Also O is the disjoint union of fibres α −1 (t) of the score map, and there are c(x) of these. Furthermore all fibres have the same cardinality. Thus we have
and summing over all G-orbits gives the result. has G-orbit of size 6 and scoreboard (6, 2, 1), and receives the value c = 6.
We shall apply Theorem 3.1 with µ equal to the indicator function of manipulability (when counting manipulable situations), and also with µ equal to the minimum size of a manipulating coalition.
Note that we need only consider voting situations whose scoreboard satisfies |a| ≥ |b| ≥ |c|. Thus our algorithm makes use of the theorem to cut the number of voting situations that must be examined, by a factor slightly less than 6. Voting situations are generated systematically. For each situation, we compute the scoreboard and the value of c above. If the scoreboard is not decreasing (c = 0), we move to the next voting situation. If c = 0, we compute the minimum coalition size, or report that manipulation is infeasible. This computation follows the description in Section 2.2. We consider type II or type I manipulations depending on whether |a| = |b| or not. We need to compute only the standard manipulations (for type I, this is manipulation making b a winner), and apply the appropriate permutation to reduce others to this case.
We have implemented the algorithm in C++ (code is available from the authors on request).
Selected numerical results
The algorithm described in Section 3 allows us to compute, for each voting situation, whether the situation can be manipulated by a coalition of voters, and the minimum size of such a manipulating coalition.
To gain an overview of manipulability, we must make some assumption as to which voting situations are the most likely to occur. We will use two of the most common models for this:
• IAC (Impartial Anonymous Culture): all voting situations are equally likely.
• IC (Impartial Culture): all profiles are equally likely. Note that a voting situation (ν 1 , . . . , ν M ) (with a total of n voters) represents n!/(
The IC model can be described probabilistically: voters act independently, and each voter is equally likely to choose any of the possible preference orders. In all but the smallest electorates, this means (due to the law of large numbers) that most of the probability is placed on voting situations where all candidates have roughly equal support, and the margin of victory is small. Such situations are often the most prone to manipulation. In contrast, the IAC model places more probability on voting situations where the margin of victory is relatively large, and manipulation may be more difficult. With our culture model (IAC or IC) and a voting rule chosen, let f n (k) denote the probability that an election involving n voters and 3 candidates is manipulable by a coalition of k or fewer voters. Previous work on manipulation has focused mainly on the extremes k = 1 (manipulation by individuals) and k = n (manipulation by any coalition); we will consider all values of k. Thus we compute the full probability distribution function f n of the random variable M , which equals the minimal coalition size (or ∞ if manipulation is not possible). We restrict to k ≤ n/2 because in every example we have seen, increasing k does not lead to any change in the probability (we do not have a formal proof of the plausible statement that the minimum size of a manipulating coalition is always at most n/2). Tables 2 and 3 give the values of f n (k) for small numbers of voters, for several positional voting rules. Tables 4 and 5 consider manipulability in a large (n = 150) population of voters.
These tables of f n (k) for small n show that the likelihood of manipulation in small committees is high. Furthermore we see that some rules are completely dominated by others (in the sense that for each k and n, f n (k) ≤ g n (k)).
It turns out that each n ≤ 12, there is often a single dominant rule among the six rules displayed here. These are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 . We also include extra information in these tables for discussion in the next section.
Note that under IAC, the rule specified by (3, 2, 0) is completely dominated by Borda, plurality and the (3, 1, 0) rule over the entire range n ≤ 12. Plurality also dominates the (10, 9, 0) and antiplurality over this range. It seems that under IAC, the "easy" case rules are much superior to the "hard" ones. The reverse is true (to a less extent) under IC however: for 6 ≤ n ≤ 12, plurality is dominated by antiplurality. However, note that again the (3, 2, 0) rule is uncompetitive, being dominated by Borda for n ≤ 11, and by at least one other "easy case" rule for each n ≤ 12.
We now move on to larger values of n. In Figure 4 we plot Pr(M < ∞) for n ≤ 50. In Figure 4 , we graph f n (k) against k for n = 48, n = 49, n = 50. The mod-3 periodicity evident for smaller n is still very clear for the hard case rules but not in the easy case. Integer effects are more important in the hard case, as we saw in Section 2.3.
Comparison with the existing literature
The present article is the first to provide exact (computational) results for positional rules other than the standard three (plurality, Borda, antiplurality). Very few authors have considered quantitative measures of manipulability for a general positional rule. Furthermore our random tiebreaking has not been commonly used. Thus, though we believe our approach to be superior to those undertaken by previous authors, direct comparison with existing results is not easy. Below we discuss a few cases in which such comparison can be profitably made. We discuss both results and methodology.
Previous authors have usually considered one or more rules, which need not be positional; the positional rules chosen have been limited to plurality, Borda, and antiplurality. Furthermore, they
• use various definitions of manipulability;
• consider various measures of manipulability;
• give statistical results for these measures that are either • • (3, 1, 0 -exact analytic (given by a formula for finite n);
-exact computational (derived by an algorithm, as in the present article);
-based on random sampling;
• consider various probability distributions on voter preferences (of which the Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture models are the most common by far).
We discuss each of these issues except the last in more detail below. Results for the three standard positional rules (and other non-positional rules) for more general preference models are presented in [11] . In [2] a so-called spatial model of voting is used. Apart from these, to our knowledge all papers have dealt with IC or IAC only, and we confine our discussion to these cases.
Definitions of manipulability
Various definitions of manipulability are used in the literature (and we discuss them below). Small differences in such definitions, and issues such as tiebreaking, will not affect our results substantially when the number n of voters is large, although tiebreaking does affect numerical results for small n. Most previous authors have used lexicographical tiebreaking.
There are two main distinctions to make. First, there is individual manipulation (in other words, by a coalition of size 1) versus more general coalitional manipulation. Individual manipulation only was studied in earlier papers while recently coalitional manipulation has been more studied. Second, there is a big difference between naive manipulation (when the manipulating voters ignore any possible gameplaying by other voters) and the more sophisticated type of manipulation that allows for the possibility of reversals or counterthreats. The only quantitative works on manipulability in the latter case of which we are aware are [10, 3] , which also consider naive manipulation; all others (including ourselves) use only the naive concept.
Some authors (for example Saari [14] ) have studied a different concept under the name of manipulation, which we do not consider to be a valid manipulation in general. Namely, one can consider the easier problem of promoting b ahead of a, without worrying that c may thereby overtake b. This is called threshold manipulability in [13] and is simpler to analyse.
Technically, our random tiebreaking does not specify a voting rule. A rule is called resolute if it always produces a unique winner from each voting situation. Ties can be handled by considering nonresolute rules. In [20] several different definitions of manipulation of non-resolute rules are presented. It is not at all clear to us which, if any, of these definitions coincides with our definition.
Measures of manipulability
Several measures or indices of manipulability are used in [7, 1, 19, 2] , all of which deal only with IC and use random sampling (the first three cited articles deal only with individual manipulation). These include such measures as the number of candidates in whose favour manipulation is possible, the "margin of error" of an attempted manipulation, and the number of voters who can individually manipulate. All these measures can be computed in a straightforward way by modifying our program; however we have not implemented these additional capabilities.
To our knowledge all other papers fit into the following framework. Let M be the minimal size of a manipulating coalition. Early papers considered the probability Pr(M = 1); that is, they considered only manipulability by a single voter. Later papers have considered the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation; that is, Pr(M < ∞). In [2] the average minimum coalition size (conditional on manipulation being possible, that is, E[M | M < ∞]) was studied. The average threshold coalition size was discussed in [13] . Our analysis in the present article yields the full probability distribution of the minimum coalition size, since we can compute Pr(M ≤ k) for each k. Thus we can readily compute any of the above statistics if desired.
There are many areas for further study, and we now list some.
• One obvious area is to understand better the type III manipulations. Here we derive the appropriate linear system and record it for possible future use. Consider Case 2(iv). The coalition members must prefer c to b, so we have x 1 = x 3 = x 4 = 0. Let y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , and y 6 denote the numbers of coalition members who strategically vote abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, and cba respectively. The conditions to be satisfied are then derived as above: • The measure Pr(M < ∞) can of course be computed for a given n by our methods, since it is just the maximum value of f n (k). If a more analytic result is required, we can easily derive one by specializing our linear systems. Explicitly, for each case listed in Table 1 , there is a maximal coalition consisting of all voters with incentive to participate in a coalition. Since some of these can still vote sincerely if they so desire, it follows that a situation is manipulable if and only if it is manipulable by the appropriate maximal coalition. Algebraically, this means that the x's in systems such as (IP: Ib) are replaced by the corresponding ν's. We can also express the scores in terms of the ν's by (1). This yields integer linear conditions in the ν's and y's only, which are necessary and sufficient for manipulation to be achievable. The problem now reduces to one of counting lattice points inside a convex region, to which standard techniques can be applied.
Some such conditions have been derived in various special cases by previous authors. One could attempt to perform such a computation for a general positional rule.
• The results for small n immediately suggest conjectures about asymptotic behaviour of rules. For example,
-plurality asymptotically minimizes Pr(M < ∞) for IAC;
-some easy case rule other than plurality or Borda minimizes Pr(M = 1) asymptotically under IAC;
-Borda is the rule for which Pr(M < ∞) converges fastest to 1 under IC.
• The measures Pr(M = 1) and Pr(M < ∞) are the most commonly used in the literature. The measure E[M |M < ∞] was introduced in [2] . In [13] several results were derived for a general positional rule under IC. It was shown that this measure is asymptotically equal to C(p)n 1/2 where C depends on p := (w 1 − w 2 )/(w 1 − w 3 ). Furthermore, for easy case rules (p ≥ 1/2), C behaves continuously in p. But for the hard case, even though C(0) is a finite constant, there is a discontinuity of C at p = 0: lim p→0 C(p) = ∞. Thus the closer a rule approaches antiplurality, the larger is E[M | M < ∞]. Hence this measure is probably not all that useful, assuming IC. However, under IAC we expect the measure to be of order n, and it may be of more use.
